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CHRZAN ON NECESSARY GRATUITOUS EVIL 
William Hasker 
Keith Chrzan claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my 
essay, "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil." I point out that Chrzan misstates 
my views on several key points, and argue that his comments fail to create 
any difficulty for my argument. 
Keith Chrzan claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my 
essay, "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil," which is directed against 
William Rowe's evidential version of the problem of evil.1 Unfortunately, 
Chrzan is mistaken in most of the views he attributes to me, and so his 
barbs miss their target. 
Chrzan cites the following definition of gratuitous evil, implying that it 
is the one I employ: gratuitous evil is evil "not necessary for the creation of 
a greater good or the prevention of some equal or greater evil." The defini-
tion is correctly quoted from my p. 24. But on the very same page, I give a 
different definition, which is suggested by Rowe's argument: gratuitous 
evil is evil "such that an omnipotent being could have prevented it without 
thereby having prevented the occurrence of some greater good." It is this 
definition which is assumed in the crucial part of my discussion with Rowe 
(in the last two sections of the paper), and thus it ought to have been the 
basis for Chrzan's discussion of my argument. 
Chrzan goes on to complain that 
Hasker equivocates on the meaning of gratuitous evil. After telling 
us that gratuitous evil is evil not necessary for the production of 
greater good, Hasker argues that it is necessary for preventing the 
undermining of morality. If an evil is justified because morality is 
undermined in its absence, it is odd to construe that evil as gratu-
itous: preventing the undermining of morality seems like a pretty 
great good. (p. 135) 
Contrary to Chrzan's assertion, I never say (and do not believe) that any 
moral evil is necessary for preventing the undermining of morality. What 
is necessary for this is God's willingness to permit the evil in question; 
whether such an evil actually occurs is up to the free agent(s) who perpe-
trate the evil, not to God. (It seems likely that Chrzan was led astray on 
this point by the title of my essay, which was deliberately paradoxical and 
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provocative. But if he had consulted note 10 (p. 41), he would have read: 
"Clearly, God might be willing to permit evils, gratuitous or otherwise, 
without those evils actually occurring. In view of this, the strictly correct 
title for this paper would be, 'The Necessity of the Possibility of Gratuitous 
Evil."') 
Unfortunately, this error carries through the rest of Chrzan's discussion. 
On p. 136, he assumes that in order to vindicate my position I would have 
to defend the view that all of the evils of the Holocaust (for example) were 
necessary to prevent the undermining of morality, so that if even one fewer 
child had perished morality would have been undermined. But of course, 
I think no such thing. Nor do I argue that, in order to prevent the under-
mining of morality, it is necessary for God to have been willing to permit 
all of the evils of the Holocaust. The burden of my argument is simply that 
there is no valid moral requirement for God to prevent all gratuitous evil, 
even all "genuinely gratuitous" evil (what Chrzan calls "unnecessary gra-
tuitous" evil). Chrzan, on the other hand, simply assumes without discus-
sion that there is such a requirement on God; thus he fails to engage my 
argument. 
Probably the most interesting point raised by Chrzan concerns our abili-
ty, as human beings, to know how things stand with regard to the overall 
level of evil in the world. In my paper, I point out (pp. 33-36) that in order 
for Rowe's counter-argument against me to work, it is necessary (though 
not sufficient) for three things to be true: 
(1) There is some particular, well-defined amount of evil such that God 
must be willing to permit that amount of evil in order to prevent the 
undermining of morality, but the permission of evil beyond this would 
exceed what is required for that purpose. 
(2) It is not possible for human beings to know, even approximately, 
what is the optimal level of evil which must be permitted in order to pre-
vent the undermining of morality. 
(3) We can, however, know with assurance that the evil in our actual 
world considerably exceeds the optimal level. 
I argue in the paper (and I still believe) that it is implausible that (1)-(3) 
are all true. Even if we assume (as I think we should not) that (1) is true, it 
seems unlikely that (2) and (3) will both be true. If we make an optimistic 
assessment of our human ability to judge such matters, then (3) might very 
well be true, but (2) would most likely be false. If, on the other hand, we 
make a more modest (and more realistic) estimate of our human capacities, 
then (2) would probably be true and (3) false. 
I acknowledge, in this connection, that there are indeed cases where we 
can know there is too much of something without being able to say what 
the exact right amount would be. (Thus, we have analogs for (2) and (3) 
which are true.) The original example, supplied by John Glenn, is that "I 
can ... judge that a certain amount of mashed potatoes is a great deal too 
much to serve at a dinner for four, without being able to judge what is pre-
cisely the right amount" (p. 43, n. 27). But as I point out, this example (and 
I suspect others as well) has the feature that "there does not exist any exact 
right amount" -and thus the analog for (1) would be false. 
Chrzan thinks there are examples that avoid this debility. It should be 
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noted that even if a plausible example could be constructed for which 
analogs of 0)-(3) are true, this would make only a modest contribution 
towards showing that (1), (2), and (3) are themselves true. But in fact, 
Chrzan has not achieved even this much. His examples concern his being 
late to a movie, thus learning he has delayed too long without knowing the 
precise starting time, and his giving his dog a fatal overdose of heartworm 
medication without knowing what the correct dose would be. In these 
cases, we do have a definite right answer, together with the knowledge 
that there is "too much" of something (medicine, or delay). So the analogs 
of (1) and (3) are true. But the analog of (2) is false in both cases. In neither 
case is it impossible for Chrzan to know the right answer; rather, these are 
instances of someone's failing to know the answer "through lack of intelli-
gence or opportunity, or simply because of sloth" (p. 44, n. 28)-most like-
ly the latter. Such cases give no support to Rowe's argument. And for 
Chrzan to invoke his "realistic" examples in this connection-such as the 
Holocaust and the Pol Pot massacres in Cambodia-is question-begging 
pure and simple. I conclude that Chrzan has not given us any reason to 
think that the argument of my essay is flawed. 
Huntington College 
NOTE 
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